1 Ocak 2014 Dergi makalesi Açık Erişim

Manou, Athanasia; Economou, Antonis; Karaesmen, Fikri

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  <dc:creator>Manou, Athanasia</dc:creator>
  <dc:creator>Economou, Antonis</dc:creator>
  <dc:creator>Karaesmen, Fikri</dc:creator>
  <dc:date>2014-01-01</dc:date>
  <dc:description>We consider a transportation station, where customers arrive according to a Poisson process. A transportation facility visits the station according to a renewal process and serves at each visit a random number of customers according to its capacity. We assume that the arriving customers decide whether to join the station or balk, based on a natural reward-cost structure. We study the strategic behavior of the customers and determine their symmetric Nash equilibrium strategies under two levels of information.</dc:description>
  <dc:identifier>https://aperta.ulakbim.gov.trrecord/65255</dc:identifier>
  <dc:identifier>oai:zenodo.org:65255</dc:identifier>
  <dc:rights>info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess</dc:rights>
  <dc:rights>http://www.opendefinition.org/licenses/cc-by</dc:rights>
  <dc:source>OPERATIONS RESEARCH 62(4) 910-925</dc:source>
  <dc:title>Strategic Customers in a Transportation Station: When Is It Optimal to Wait?</dc:title>
  <dc:type>info:eu-repo/semantics/article</dc:type>
  <dc:type>publication-article</dc:type>
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