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Strategic Customers in a Transportation Station: When Is It Optimal to Wait?

Manou, Athanasia; Economou, Antonis; Karaesmen, Fikri


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{
  "DOI": "10.1287/opre.2014.1280", 
  "abstract": "We consider a transportation station, where customers arrive according to a Poisson process. A transportation facility visits the station according to a renewal process and serves at each visit a random number of customers according to its capacity. We assume that the arriving customers decide whether to join the station or balk, based on a natural reward-cost structure. We study the strategic behavior of the customers and determine their symmetric Nash equilibrium strategies under two levels of information.", 
  "author": [
    {
      "family": "Manou", 
      "given": " Athanasia"
    }, 
    {
      "family": "Economou", 
      "given": " Antonis"
    }, 
    {
      "family": "Karaesmen", 
      "given": " Fikri"
    }
  ], 
  "container_title": "OPERATIONS RESEARCH", 
  "id": "65255", 
  "issue": "4", 
  "issued": {
    "date-parts": [
      [
        2014, 
        1, 
        1
      ]
    ]
  }, 
  "page": "910-925", 
  "title": "Strategic Customers in a Transportation Station: When Is It Optimal to Wait?", 
  "type": "article-journal", 
  "volume": "62"
}
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