1 Ocak 2014 Dergi makalesi Açık Erişim

Manou, Athanasia; Economou, Antonis; Karaesmen, Fikri

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  "@id": 65255, 
  "@type": "ScholarlyArticle", 
  "creator": [
    {
      "@type": "Person", 
      "affiliation": "Univ Athens, Dept Math, Athens 15784, Greece", 
      "name": "Manou, Athanasia"
    }, 
    {
      "@type": "Person", 
      "affiliation": "Univ Athens, Dept Math, Athens 15784, Greece", 
      "name": "Economou, Antonis"
    }, 
    {
      "@type": "Person", 
      "affiliation": "Koc Univ, Dept Ind Engn, TR-34450 Istanbul, Turkey", 
      "name": "Karaesmen, Fikri"
    }
  ], 
  "datePublished": "2014-01-01", 
  "description": "We consider a transportation station, where customers arrive according to a Poisson process. A transportation facility visits the station according to a renewal process and serves at each visit a random number of customers according to its capacity. We assume that the arriving customers decide whether to join the station or balk, based on a natural reward-cost structure. We study the strategic behavior of the customers and determine their symmetric Nash equilibrium strategies under two levels of information.", 
  "headline": "Strategic Customers in a Transportation Station: When Is It Optimal to Wait?", 
  "identifier": 65255, 
  "image": "https://aperta.ulakbim.gov.tr/static/img/logo/aperta_logo_with_icon.svg", 
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  "name": "Strategic Customers in a Transportation Station: When Is It Optimal to Wait?", 
  "url": "https://aperta.ulakbim.gov.tr/record/65255"
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