1 Ocak 2014 Dergi makalesi Açık Erişim

Manou, Athanasia; Economou, Antonis; Karaesmen, Fikri

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  <identifier identifierType="URL">https://aperta.ulakbim.gov.tr/record/65255</identifier>
  <creators>
    <creator>
      <creatorName>Manou, Athanasia</creatorName>
      <givenName>Athanasia</givenName>
      <familyName>Manou</familyName>
      <affiliation>Univ Athens, Dept Math, Athens 15784, Greece</affiliation>
    </creator>
    <creator>
      <creatorName>Economou, Antonis</creatorName>
      <givenName>Antonis</givenName>
      <familyName>Economou</familyName>
      <affiliation>Univ Athens, Dept Math, Athens 15784, Greece</affiliation>
    </creator>
    <creator>
      <creatorName>Karaesmen, Fikri</creatorName>
      <givenName>Fikri</givenName>
      <familyName>Karaesmen</familyName>
      <affiliation>Koc Univ, Dept Ind Engn, TR-34450 Istanbul, Turkey</affiliation>
    </creator>
  </creators>
  <titles>
    <title>Strategic Customers In A Transportation Station: When Is It Optimal To Wait?</title>
  </titles>
  <publisher>Aperta</publisher>
  <publicationYear>2014</publicationYear>
  <dates>
    <date dateType="Issued">2014-01-01</date>
  </dates>
  <resourceType resourceTypeGeneral="Text">Journal article</resourceType>
  <alternateIdentifiers>
    <alternateIdentifier alternateIdentifierType="url">https://aperta.ulakbim.gov.tr/record/65255</alternateIdentifier>
  </alternateIdentifiers>
  <relatedIdentifiers>
    <relatedIdentifier relatedIdentifierType="DOI" relationType="IsIdenticalTo">10.1287/opre.2014.1280</relatedIdentifier>
  </relatedIdentifiers>
  <rightsList>
    <rights rightsURI="http://www.opendefinition.org/licenses/cc-by">Creative Commons Attribution</rights>
    <rights rightsURI="info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess">Open Access</rights>
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  <descriptions>
    <description descriptionType="Abstract">We consider a transportation station, where customers arrive according to a Poisson process. A transportation facility visits the station according to a renewal process and serves at each visit a random number of customers according to its capacity. We assume that the arriving customers decide whether to join the station or balk, based on a natural reward-cost structure. We study the strategic behavior of the customers and determine their symmetric Nash equilibrium strategies under two levels of information.</description>
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