Dergi makalesi Açık Erişim

Strategic Customers in a Transportation Station: When Is It Optimal to Wait?

   Manou, Athanasia; Economou, Antonis; Karaesmen, Fikri

We consider a transportation station, where customers arrive according to a Poisson process. A transportation facility visits the station according to a renewal process and serves at each visit a random number of customers according to its capacity. We assume that the arriving customers decide whether to join the station or balk, based on a natural reward-cost structure. We study the strategic behavior of the customers and determine their symmetric Nash equilibrium strategies under two levels of information.

Dosyalar (162 Bytes)
Dosya adı Boyutu
bib-86fa8de0-cb78-4979-a724-fdb88875d519.txt
md5:b53a5fbd8edef3928ed0b0db56794c9d
162 Bytes İndir
57
7
görüntülenme
indirilme
Görüntülenme 57
İndirme 7
Veri hacmi 1.1 kB
Tekil görüntülenme 51
Tekil indirme 7
Atıflar
  • Citation Indexes: 45
Okunma İstatistikleri
  • Readers: 27

Alıntı yap

Manou, A., Economou, A. ve Karaesmen, F. (2014). Strategic Customers in a Transportation Station: When Is It Optimal to Wait?. OPERATIONS RESEARCH, 62(4), 910–925. doi:10.1287/opre.2014.1280

Loading...