Dergi makalesi Açık Erişim
Manou, Athanasia; Economou, Antonis; Karaesmen, Fikri
We consider a transportation station, where customers arrive according to a Poisson process. A transportation facility visits the station according to a renewal process and serves at each visit a random number of customers according to its capacity. We assume that the arriving customers decide whether to join the station or balk, based on a natural reward-cost structure. We study the strategic behavior of the customers and determine their symmetric Nash equilibrium strategies under two levels of information.
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Manou, A., Economou, A. ve Karaesmen, F. (2014). Strategic Customers in a Transportation Station: When Is It Optimal to Wait?. OPERATIONS RESEARCH, 62(4), 910–925. doi:10.1287/opre.2014.1280