1 Ocak 2020 Dergi makalesi Açık Erişim

Alan, Sule; Ertac, Seda; Gumren, Mert

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    <subfield code="a">Cheating and incentives in a performance context: Evidence from a field experiment on children</subfield>
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    <subfield code="a">Alan, Sule</subfield>
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    <subfield code="a">We study cheating behavior in a large sample of elementary school children in the context of a creative performance task, in the presence and absence of performance incentives. Our data come from a sample of 720 elementary school children with an average age of 8, and contain rich information on a large set of correlates, such as risk and time preferences, IQ, gender and family characteristics. We document that children with higher IQ and higher socioeconomic status have a higher likelihood of cheating. We find that the presence of incentives for better performance does not increase cheating behavior. We also document an interesting interaction between altruism and incentives: altruistic students cheat significantly less in the presence of incentives. (C) 2019 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.</subfield>
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