1 Ocak 2020 Dergi makalesi Açık Erişim

Alan, Sule; Ertac, Seda; Gumren, Mert

Dublin Core

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  <dc:creator>Alan, Sule</dc:creator>
  <dc:creator>Ertac, Seda</dc:creator>
  <dc:creator>Gumren, Mert</dc:creator>
  <dc:date>2020-01-01</dc:date>
  <dc:description>We study cheating behavior in a large sample of elementary school children in the context of a creative performance task, in the presence and absence of performance incentives. Our data come from a sample of 720 elementary school children with an average age of 8, and contain rich information on a large set of correlates, such as risk and time preferences, IQ, gender and family characteristics. We document that children with higher IQ and higher socioeconomic status have a higher likelihood of cheating. We find that the presence of incentives for better performance does not increase cheating behavior. We also document an interesting interaction between altruism and incentives: altruistic students cheat significantly less in the presence of incentives. (C) 2019 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.</dc:description>
  <dc:identifier>https://aperta.ulakbim.gov.trrecord/4983</dc:identifier>
  <dc:identifier>oai:zenodo.org:4983</dc:identifier>
  <dc:rights>info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess</dc:rights>
  <dc:rights>http://www.opendefinition.org/licenses/cc-by</dc:rights>
  <dc:source>JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR &amp; ORGANIZATION 179 681-701</dc:source>
  <dc:title>Cheating and incentives in a performance context: Evidence from a field experiment on children</dc:title>
  <dc:type>info:eu-repo/semantics/article</dc:type>
  <dc:type>publication-article</dc:type>
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