1 Ocak 2022 Dergi makalesi Açık Erişim

Yilmaz, Murat; Yilmaz, Ozgur

Dublin Core

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  <dc:creator>Yilmaz, Murat</dc:creator>
  <dc:creator>Yilmaz, Ozgur</dc:creator>
  <dc:date>2022-01-01</dc:date>
  <dc:description>A central stability notion for allocation problems when there are private endowments is core: no coalition should be able to block the allocation. But, for an exchange economy of discrete resources, core can be empty. An alternative stability axiom is the bargaining set a la Aumann and Maschler (Advances in game theory, Annals of mathematics studies, Princeton University Press, Princeton, pp 443-476, 1964): a blocking by a coalition is justified only if there is no counter-objection to it and an allocation is in the bargaining set if there does not exist a justified blocking. Allowing for weak preferences, we prove that any allocation obtained by the well-known Top Trading Cycles class is in the bargaining set, but not all allocations in the bargaining set can be obtained by this class.</dc:description>
  <dc:identifier>https://aperta.ulakbim.gov.trrecord/261977</dc:identifier>
  <dc:identifier>oai:aperta.ulakbim.gov.tr:261977</dc:identifier>
  <dc:rights>info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess</dc:rights>
  <dc:rights>http://www.opendefinition.org/licenses/cc-by</dc:rights>
  <dc:source>REVIEW OF ECONOMIC DESIGN 26(4) 561-580</dc:source>
  <dc:title>Stability of an allocation of objects</dc:title>
  <dc:type>info:eu-repo/semantics/article</dc:type>
  <dc:type>publication-article</dc:type>
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