1 Ocak 2022 Dergi makalesi Açık Erişim

Yilmaz, Murat; Yilmaz, Ozgur

Citation Style Language JSON

{
  "DOI": "10.1007/s10058-021-00280-5", 
  "abstract": "A central stability notion for allocation problems when there are private endowments is core: no coalition should be able to block the allocation. But, for an exchange economy of discrete resources, core can be empty. An alternative stability axiom is the bargaining set a la Aumann and Maschler (Advances in game theory, Annals of mathematics studies, Princeton University Press, Princeton, pp 443-476, 1964): a blocking by a coalition is justified only if there is no counter-objection to it and an allocation is in the bargaining set if there does not exist a justified blocking. Allowing for weak preferences, we prove that any allocation obtained by the well-known Top Trading Cycles class is in the bargaining set, but not all allocations in the bargaining set can be obtained by this class.", 
  "author": [
    {
      "family": "Yilmaz", 
      "given": " Murat"
    }, 
    {
      "family": "Yilmaz", 
      "given": " Ozgur"
    }
  ], 
  "container_title": "REVIEW OF ECONOMIC DESIGN", 
  "id": "261977", 
  "issue": "4", 
  "issued": {
    "date-parts": [
      [
        2022, 
        1, 
        1
      ]
    ]
  }, 
  "page": "561-580", 
  "title": "Stability of an allocation of objects", 
  "type": "article-journal", 
  "volume": "26"
}