1 Ocak 2022 Dergi makalesi Açık Erişim

Yilmaz, Murat; Yilmaz, Ozgur

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  "@context": "https://schema.org/", 
  "@id": 261977, 
  "@type": "ScholarlyArticle", 
  "creator": [
    {
      "@type": "Person", 
      "affiliation": "Bogazici Univ, Dept Econ, TR-34342 Istanbul, Turkey", 
      "name": "Yilmaz, Murat"
    }, 
    {
      "@type": "Person", 
      "affiliation": "Koc Univ, Dept Econ, TR-34450 Istanbul, Turkey", 
      "name": "Yilmaz, Ozgur"
    }
  ], 
  "datePublished": "2022-01-01", 
  "description": "A central stability notion for allocation problems when there are private endowments is core: no coalition should be able to block the allocation. But, for an exchange economy of discrete resources, core can be empty. An alternative stability axiom is the bargaining set a la Aumann and Maschler (Advances in game theory, Annals of mathematics studies, Princeton University Press, Princeton, pp 443-476, 1964): a blocking by a coalition is justified only if there is no counter-objection to it and an allocation is in the bargaining set if there does not exist a justified blocking. Allowing for weak preferences, we prove that any allocation obtained by the well-known Top Trading Cycles class is in the bargaining set, but not all allocations in the bargaining set can be obtained by this class.", 
  "headline": "Stability of an allocation of objects", 
  "identifier": 261977, 
  "image": "https://aperta.ulakbim.gov.tr/static/img/logo/aperta_logo_with_icon.svg", 
  "license": "http://www.opendefinition.org/licenses/cc-by", 
  "name": "Stability of an allocation of objects", 
  "url": "https://aperta.ulakbim.gov.tr/record/261977"
}