1 Ocak 2022 Dergi makalesi Açık Erişim

Yilmaz, Murat; Yilmaz, Ozgur

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  <identifier identifierType="URL">https://aperta.ulakbim.gov.tr/record/261977</identifier>
  <creators>
    <creator>
      <creatorName>Yilmaz, Murat</creatorName>
      <givenName>Murat</givenName>
      <familyName>Yilmaz</familyName>
      <affiliation>Bogazici Univ, Dept Econ, TR-34342 Istanbul, Turkey</affiliation>
    </creator>
    <creator>
      <creatorName>Yilmaz, Ozgur</creatorName>
      <givenName>Ozgur</givenName>
      <familyName>Yilmaz</familyName>
      <affiliation>Koc Univ, Dept Econ, TR-34450 Istanbul, Turkey</affiliation>
    </creator>
  </creators>
  <titles>
    <title>Stability Of An Allocation Of Objects</title>
  </titles>
  <publisher>Aperta</publisher>
  <publicationYear>2022</publicationYear>
  <dates>
    <date dateType="Issued">2022-01-01</date>
  </dates>
  <resourceType resourceTypeGeneral="Text">Journal article</resourceType>
  <alternateIdentifiers>
    <alternateIdentifier alternateIdentifierType="url">https://aperta.ulakbim.gov.tr/record/261977</alternateIdentifier>
  </alternateIdentifiers>
  <relatedIdentifiers>
    <relatedIdentifier relatedIdentifierType="DOI" relationType="IsIdenticalTo">10.1007/s10058-021-00280-5</relatedIdentifier>
  </relatedIdentifiers>
  <rightsList>
    <rights rightsURI="http://www.opendefinition.org/licenses/cc-by">Creative Commons Attribution</rights>
    <rights rightsURI="info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess">Open Access</rights>
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  <descriptions>
    <description descriptionType="Abstract">A central stability notion for allocation problems when there are private endowments is core: no coalition should be able to block the allocation. But, for an exchange economy of discrete resources, core can be empty. An alternative stability axiom is the bargaining set a la Aumann and Maschler (Advances in game theory, Annals of mathematics studies, Princeton University Press, Princeton, pp 443-476, 1964): a blocking by a coalition is justified only if there is no counter-objection to it and an allocation is in the bargaining set if there does not exist a justified blocking. Allowing for weak preferences, we prove that any allocation obtained by the well-known Top Trading Cycles class is in the bargaining set, but not all allocations in the bargaining set can be obtained by this class.</description>
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