Dergi makalesi Açık Erişim
Yilmaz, Murat; Yilmaz, Ozgur
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"affiliation": "Bogazici Univ, Dept Econ, TR-34342 Istanbul, Turkey",
"name": "Yilmaz, Murat"
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"affiliation": "Koc Univ, Dept Econ, TR-34450 Istanbul, Turkey",
"name": "Yilmaz, Ozgur"
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"description": "A central stability notion for allocation problems when there are private endowments is core: no coalition should be able to block the allocation. But, for an exchange economy of discrete resources, core can be empty. An alternative stability axiom is the bargaining set a la Aumann and Maschler (Advances in game theory, Annals of mathematics studies, Princeton University Press, Princeton, pp 443-476, 1964): a blocking by a coalition is justified only if there is no counter-objection to it and an allocation is in the bargaining set if there does not exist a justified blocking. Allowing for weak preferences, we prove that any allocation obtained by the well-known Top Trading Cycles class is in the bargaining set, but not all allocations in the bargaining set can be obtained by this class.",
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"issue": "4",
"pages": "561-580",
"title": "REVIEW OF ECONOMIC DESIGN",
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"publication_date": "2022-01-01",
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"title": "Stability of an allocation of objects"
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