Dergi makalesi Açık Erişim

Stability of an allocation of objects

Yilmaz, Murat; Yilmaz, Ozgur


JSON

{
  "conceptrecid": "261976", 
  "created": "2023-07-29T15:38:52.901759+00:00", 
  "doi": "10.1007/s10058-021-00280-5", 
  "files": [
    {
      "bucket": "4b58e92e-4a8b-4de2-8d51-2349eb9f6834", 
      "checksum": "md5:e9194972c5bc44a59bfed2b55e7ff10d", 
      "key": "bib-e8a8af0c-6e1f-4212-96c7-fc01c90e3241.txt", 
      "links": {
        "self": "https://aperta.ulakbim.gov.tr/api/files/4b58e92e-4a8b-4de2-8d51-2349eb9f6834/bib-e8a8af0c-6e1f-4212-96c7-fc01c90e3241.txt"
      }, 
      "size": 113, 
      "type": "txt"
    }
  ], 
  "id": 261977, 
  "links": {
    "badge": "https://aperta.ulakbim.gov.tr/badge/doi/10.1007/s10058-021-00280-5.svg", 
    "bucket": "https://aperta.ulakbim.gov.tr/api/files/4b58e92e-4a8b-4de2-8d51-2349eb9f6834", 
    "doi": "https://doi.org/10.1007/s10058-021-00280-5", 
    "html": "https://aperta.ulakbim.gov.tr/record/261977", 
    "latest": "https://aperta.ulakbim.gov.tr/api/records/261977", 
    "latest_html": "https://aperta.ulakbim.gov.tr/record/261977"
  }, 
  "metadata": {
    "access_right": "open", 
    "access_right_category": "success", 
    "communities": [
      {
        "id": "tubitak-destekli-proje-yayinlari"
      }
    ], 
    "creators": [
      {
        "affiliation": "Bogazici Univ, Dept Econ, TR-34342 Istanbul, Turkey", 
        "name": "Yilmaz, Murat"
      }, 
      {
        "affiliation": "Koc Univ, Dept Econ, TR-34450 Istanbul, Turkey", 
        "name": "Yilmaz, Ozgur"
      }
    ], 
    "description": "A central stability notion for allocation problems when there are private endowments is core: no coalition should be able to block the allocation. But, for an exchange economy of discrete resources, core can be empty. An alternative stability axiom is the bargaining set a la Aumann and Maschler (Advances in game theory, Annals of mathematics studies, Princeton University Press, Princeton, pp 443-476, 1964): a blocking by a coalition is justified only if there is no counter-objection to it and an allocation is in the bargaining set if there does not exist a justified blocking. Allowing for weak preferences, we prove that any allocation obtained by the well-known Top Trading Cycles class is in the bargaining set, but not all allocations in the bargaining set can be obtained by this class.", 
    "doi": "10.1007/s10058-021-00280-5", 
    "has_grant": false, 
    "journal": {
      "issue": "4", 
      "pages": "561-580", 
      "title": "REVIEW OF ECONOMIC DESIGN", 
      "volume": "26"
    }, 
    "license": {
      "id": "cc-by"
    }, 
    "publication_date": "2022-01-01", 
    "relations": {
      "version": [
        {
          "count": 1, 
          "index": 0, 
          "is_last": true, 
          "last_child": {
            "pid_type": "recid", 
            "pid_value": "261977"
          }, 
          "parent": {
            "pid_type": "recid", 
            "pid_value": "261976"
          }
        }
      ]
    }, 
    "resource_type": {
      "subtype": "article", 
      "title": "Dergi makalesi", 
      "type": "publication"
    }, 
    "science_branches": [
      "Di\u011fer"
    ], 
    "title": "Stability of an allocation of objects"
  }, 
  "owners": [
    1
  ], 
  "revision": 1, 
  "stats": {
    "downloads": 2.0, 
    "unique_downloads": 2.0, 
    "unique_views": 2.0, 
    "version_downloads": 2.0, 
    "version_unique_downloads": 2.0, 
    "version_unique_views": 2.0, 
    "version_views": 2.0, 
    "version_volume": 226.0, 
    "views": 2.0, 
    "volume": 226.0
  }, 
  "updated": "2023-07-29T15:38:52.955730+00:00"
}
2
2
görüntülenme
indirilme
Görüntülenme 2
İndirme 2
Veri hacmi 226 Bytes
Tekil görüntülenme 2
Tekil indirme 2

Alıntı yap