1 Ocak 2019 Dergi makalesi Açık Erişim

Ertac, Seda; Gumren, Mert; Kockesen, Levent

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  <identifier identifierType="URL">https://aperta.ulakbim.gov.tr/record/72319</identifier>
  <creators>
    <creator>
      <creatorName>Ertac, Seda</creatorName>
      <givenName>Seda</givenName>
      <familyName>Ertac</familyName>
      <affiliation>Koc Univ, Dept Econ, Rumelifeneri Yolu Sariyer, TR-34450 Istanbul, Turkey</affiliation>
    </creator>
    <creator>
      <creatorName>Gumren, Mert</creatorName>
      <givenName>Mert</givenName>
      <familyName>Gumren</familyName>
      <affiliation>Koc Univ, Dept Econ, Rumelifeneri Yolu Sariyer, TR-34450 Istanbul, Turkey</affiliation>
    </creator>
    <creator>
      <creatorName>Kockesen, Levent</creatorName>
      <givenName>Levent</givenName>
      <familyName>Kockesen</familyName>
    </creator>
  </creators>
  <titles>
    <title>Strategic Feedback In Teams: Theory And Experimental Evidence</title>
  </titles>
  <publisher>Aperta</publisher>
  <publicationYear>2019</publicationYear>
  <dates>
    <date dateType="Issued">2019-01-01</date>
  </dates>
  <resourceType resourceTypeGeneral="Text">Journal article</resourceType>
  <alternateIdentifiers>
    <alternateIdentifier alternateIdentifierType="url">https://aperta.ulakbim.gov.tr/record/72319</alternateIdentifier>
  </alternateIdentifiers>
  <relatedIdentifiers>
    <relatedIdentifier relatedIdentifierType="DOI" relationType="IsIdenticalTo">10.1016/j.jebo.2019.04.005</relatedIdentifier>
  </relatedIdentifiers>
  <rightsList>
    <rights rightsURI="http://www.opendefinition.org/licenses/cc-by">Creative Commons Attribution</rights>
    <rights rightsURI="info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess">Open Access</rights>
  </rightsList>
  <descriptions>
    <description descriptionType="Abstract">We theoretically and experimentally analyze public and private feedback in teams that are characterized by different performance technologies. We consider a setting where the principal has some performance relevant private information and can either report this information truthfully or strategically withhold feedback. We find that if team performance is determined by the best performer (the "best-shot technology"), then both public and private feedback are better than no feedback unless the team is composed of all low performers, in which case no feedback is best. If, on the other hand, team performance is determined by the worst performer (the weakest-link technology), then no feedback is the best regime unless the team is composed of all high performers, in which-case public or private feedback is better. Our results have implications for feedback policies in teams, organizations, and the workplace. (C) 2019 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.</description>
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