1 Ocak 2021 Dergi makalesi Açık Erişim

Aytac, Selim Erdem

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  <identifier identifierType="URL">https://aperta.ulakbim.gov.tr/record/234432</identifier>
  <creators>
    <creator>
      <creatorName>Aytac, Selim Erdem</creatorName>
      <givenName>Selim Erdem</givenName>
      <familyName>Aytac</familyName>
      <affiliation>Koc Univ, Dept Int Relat, Istanbul, Turkey</affiliation>
    </creator>
  </creators>
  <titles>
    <title>Effectiveness Of Incumbent'S Strategic Communication During Economic Crisis Under Electoral Authoritarianism: Evidence From Turkey</title>
  </titles>
  <publisher>Aperta</publisher>
  <publicationYear>2021</publicationYear>
  <dates>
    <date dateType="Issued">2021-01-01</date>
  </dates>
  <resourceType resourceTypeGeneral="Text">Journal article</resourceType>
  <alternateIdentifiers>
    <alternateIdentifier alternateIdentifierType="url">https://aperta.ulakbim.gov.tr/record/234432</alternateIdentifier>
  </alternateIdentifiers>
  <relatedIdentifiers>
    <relatedIdentifier relatedIdentifierType="DOI" relationType="IsIdenticalTo">10.1017/S0003055421000587</relatedIdentifier>
  </relatedIdentifiers>
  <rightsList>
    <rights rightsURI="http://www.opendefinition.org/licenses/cc-by">Creative Commons Attribution</rights>
    <rights rightsURI="info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess">Open Access</rights>
  </rightsList>
  <descriptions>
    <description descriptionType="Abstract">To minimize damage to their popularity during economic downturns, rulers in electoral autocracies can draw on their propaganda advantage to keep the economy off the political agenda or shift the blame to other actors. How successful are these strategies in swaying citizens' views? While electoral autocrats frequently resort to these strategies, there is surprisingly little evidence about their effectiveness. To address this gap, I took advantage of the recent economic crisis in Turkey and deployed a population-based survey experiment that mimicked incumbent's use of these strategies. I find that incumbent's efforts of shifting the blame fail to elicit intended effects among large parts of the electorate. In contrast, changing the political agenda away from the economy to an issue area that is more favorable for the incumbent is more effective for shoring up popular support. These findings contribute to our understanding of the mechanisms that help sustain electoral authoritarianism.</description>
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