1 Ocak 2015 Konferans bildirisi Açık Erişim

Akgun, Mete; Caglayan, M. Ufuk

MARC21 XML

<?xml version='1.0' encoding='UTF-8'?>
<record xmlns="http://www.loc.gov/MARC21/slim">
  <leader>00000nam##2200000uu#4500</leader>
  <datafield tag="700" ind1=" " ind2=" ">
    <subfield code="a">Caglayan, M. Ufuk</subfield>
    <subfield code="u">Bogazici Univ, Dept Comp Engn, Istanbul, Turkey</subfield>
  </datafield>
  <datafield tag="980" ind1=" " ind2=" ">
    <subfield code="a">user-tubitak-adresli-yayinlar</subfield>
  </datafield>
  <datafield tag="540" ind1=" " ind2=" ">
    <subfield code="a">Creative Commons Attribution</subfield>
    <subfield code="u">http://www.opendefinition.org/licenses/cc-by</subfield>
  </datafield>
  <datafield tag="773" ind1=" " ind2=" ">
    <subfield code="i">isVersionOf</subfield>
    <subfield code="a">10.81043/aperta.100762</subfield>
    <subfield code="n">doi</subfield>
  </datafield>
  <datafield tag="024" ind1=" " ind2=" ">
    <subfield code="a">10.81043/aperta.100763</subfield>
    <subfield code="2">doi</subfield>
  </datafield>
  <datafield tag="245" ind1=" " ind2=" ">
    <subfield code="a">Weaknesses of Two RFID Protocols Regarding De-synchronization Attacks</subfield>
  </datafield>
  <datafield tag="100" ind1=" " ind2=" ">
    <subfield code="a">Akgun, Mete</subfield>
    <subfield code="u">Tubitak UEKAE, TR-41470 Gebze, Kocaeli, Turkey</subfield>
  </datafield>
  <datafield tag="909" ind1="C" ind2="O">
    <subfield code="o">oai:zenodo.org:100763</subfield>
    <subfield code="p">user-tubitak-adresli-yayinlar</subfield>
  </datafield>
  <datafield tag="650" ind1="1" ind2="7">
    <subfield code="2">opendefinition.org</subfield>
    <subfield code="a">cc-by</subfield>
  </datafield>
  <datafield tag="260" ind1=" " ind2=" ">
    <subfield code="c">2015-01-01</subfield>
  </datafield>
  <datafield tag="856" ind1="4" ind2=" ">
    <subfield code="u">https://aperta.ulakbim.gov.trrecord/100763/files/bib-f20fe827-7e9b-40da-8157-d307844cf27a.txt</subfield>
    <subfield code="z">md5:4ad93c9a35d70c646112d377e273ec1d</subfield>
    <subfield code="s">184</subfield>
  </datafield>
  <datafield tag="542" ind1=" " ind2=" ">
    <subfield code="l">open</subfield>
  </datafield>
  <controlfield tag="005">20210316143049.0</controlfield>
  <controlfield tag="001">100763</controlfield>
  <datafield tag="980" ind1=" " ind2=" ">
    <subfield code="a">publication</subfield>
    <subfield code="b">conferencepaper</subfield>
  </datafield>
  <datafield tag="711" ind1=" " ind2=" ">
    <subfield code="a">2015 INTERNATIONAL WIRELESS COMMUNICATIONS &amp; MOBILE COMPUTING CONFERENCE (IWCMC)</subfield>
  </datafield>
  <datafield tag="520" ind1=" " ind2=" ">
    <subfield code="a">Radio Frequency Identification (RFID) protocols should have a secret updating phase in order to protect the privacy of RFID tags against tag tracing attacks. In the literature, there are many lightweight RFID authentication protocols that try to provide key updating with lightweight cryptographic primitives. In this paper, we analyze the security of two recently proposed lightweight RFID authentication protocol against de-synchronization attacks. We show that secret values shared between the back-end server and any given tag can be easily desynchronized. This weakness stems from the insufficient design of these protocols.</subfield>
  </datafield>
</record>