Phenomenological experience of a negative event when an older self is imagined

When individuals become older, they sometimes interpret their autobiographical memories in perspective and remember them more positively. In the present study, we investigated whether simulating an autobiographical memory as if an older individual experienced it would change its phenomenological experience. In the first session of the experiment, young participants retrieved and phenomenologically rated an important negative event (original memory). One week later, in the second session, half of the participants simulated themselves as older (older-self condition) and the other half simulated another older individual (older-other condition) and imagined that this simulated individual experienced the event at the same age that they did (simulated memory). They provided the same phenomenological experience ratings for the simulated memory. Lastly, they rated the original memory once more as their current selves (post-simulation memory) on the same scales. The positivity of the memories was higher in the older-self condition than in the older-other condition. Compared to the original memory, participants experienced reduced negative affect for the simulated memory, which remained for the post-simulation memory. The simulated memory was less likely to be viewed from a field perspective and it revealed lower vividness and reliving ratings than the original and post-simulation memory. The emotional intensity of the simulated memory was lower than the original memory, but the intensity of the original and the post-simulation memory did not differ. The present study highlights the strong relationship between self and memory, showing how age-related distancing from the current self can be reflected in the phenomenological experience of memories.