Published January 1, 2018
| Version v1
Journal article
Open
Parking Fees and Retail Prices
Creators
- 1. Sabanci Univ, Fac Arts & Social Sci, TR-34956 Istanbul, Turkey
- 2. Univ British Columbia, Sauder Sch Business, 2053 Main Mall, Vancouver, BC V6T 1Z2, Canada
- 3. Penn State Univ, Dept Econ, University Pk, PA 16802 USA
Description
We study the pricing strategy of a retailer that supplies both self-parking and valet parking space. Shoppers differ in their valuations of the good and valet parking, and dislike the prospect of paying for parking if the retailer does not have what they want. As insurance, an unregulated retailer provides self-parking free and embeds the cost in retail prices. It may price valet parking above or below cost. In the social optimum, self-parking is free and valet parking is priced at a loss. Relative to the unregulated equilibrium, more valet parking and total parking are provided.
Files
bib-43798155-e117-4cb1-b0f2-69dfcbef95cf.txt
Files
(132 Bytes)
| Name | Size | Download all |
|---|---|---|
|
md5:e091edc74abf445deaefb2ba673019dd
|
132 Bytes | Preview Download |