Published January 1, 2023
| Version v1
Journal article
Open
Behavioral implementation under incomplete information
Creators
- 1. Sabanci Univ, Fac Arts & Social Sci, Tuzla, Turkiye
- 2. Bilkent Univ, Dept Econ, Bilkent, Turkiye
Description
We investigate implementation under incomplete information allowing for individuals' choices featuring violations of rationality. Our primitives are individuals' interim choices that do not have to satisfy the weak axiom of revealed preferences. In this setting, we provide necessary as well as sufficient conditions for behavioral implementation under incomplete information. We also introduce behavioral interim incentive Pareto efficiency and investigate its implementability under incomplete information. (c) 2023 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
Files
bib-788ce49e-66a2-4ced-955b-7007cc424c44.txt
Files
(137 Bytes)
| Name | Size | Download all |
|---|---|---|
|
md5:64986e67b509773e2191adef46a43dd5
|
137 Bytes | Preview Download |